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AFTER THE ACCESSION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLICS TO RUSSIA, NATO FINDS ITSELF IN A DILEMMA — RT EN 3 Oct 2022 20:02 By Scott Knight

By pouring tens of billions of dollars worth of military aid into Ukraine, NATO intended to create “game-changing momentum” with the goal of throwing Russia off balance. However, by holding referendums in Kherson, Zaporozhye, Donetsk and Lugansk to reintegrate these regions into the Russian Federation, Russia has given the game a whole new dynamic of its own.

The ancient Greeks spoke of lemma as representing a logical premise, a matter of fact. This was in contrast to a dilemma or “double premise” where one was faced with an either-or choice. The Romans further developed this philosophy by referring to the “double premise” as referring to the argumentum cornutum, the “horned argument”, where by answering one argument an individual is impaled by the logic of the second. There lie the ancient roots of the modern idiom “horns of dilemma”.

This, for example, is the ultimate goal of maneuver warfare: to position one’s forces in such a way that the enemy is not presented with a good option – should they nevertheless have to react to an urgent threat, they would be overwhelmed by the other threat.

The Russian military operation in Ukraine, which has been going on for more than seven months, has provided numerous examples in which the armed forces of both sides have been faced with situations that have forced them to change their preferred tactics. The Russian diversionary maneuver towards Kyiv at the start of the military operation prevented the Ukrainians from strengthening their forces in eastern Ukraine, while the recently completed Ukrainian counter-offensive at Kharkov forced a hasty Russian withdrawal from a significant part of previously occupied Ukrainian territory.

In both examples, one side was presented with a lemma, a single problem that needed to be acted upon. But neither side was able to drive the opponent “on the horns of a dilemma” and force a response that would have resulted in immediate impaling regardless of the option chosen. The reason for this is simple: very seldom do competent military commanders allow themselves to be faced with a military problem for which there is no viable answer. War, it seems, is hard work and dilemmas don’t come out of the trees.

Or maybe yes? Since Boris Johnson flew to Kyiv last April to persuade Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky to pull out of peace talks with Russia, NATO has launched a program. This program aims to provide Ukraine with tens of billions of dollars in military equipment and financial support. This also includes the transfer of modern heavy weapons and the use of facilities on western soil where tens of thousands of Ukrainian troops can be trained and organized without fear of Russian intervention.

The purpose behind infusing arms into Ukraine was to enable Kyiv not only to prolong the conflict but also to enable offensive military operations aimed at driving Russia out of those areas that View Kyiv and its supporters as occupied Ukrainian territory, including Donbass and Crimea. The counter-offensive in Kharkov in early September underscored the grave consequences of NATO’s actions. Although the Kharkov victory has the character of a Pyrrhic victory given the massive loss of life and materiel suffered by the invading Ukrainian forces, it was nonetheless a Ukrainian victory – and one that forced a Russian retreat.

By transforming the Ukrainian army into a Ukrainian-manned NATO army, the US-led alliance had actually turned the game from a simple “Russia versus Ukraine military operation” to a “Russia fighting the collective West” in which the originally military resources provided by Moscow for the fight were no longer sufficient.
Point win for Ukraine/NATO.

However, Russia did not simply endure NATO’s “groundbreaking momentum”. In response to the new reality on the ground in Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin chose not to simply up the ante in this new NATO-led game, but to completely change the game plan. Not only did he order the partial mobilization of some 300,000 reservists to reinforce the troops currently deployed in the military operation. Putin also authorized referendums in the four areas where Russian forces are currently fighting – Kherson and Zaporozhye, and Donetsk and Lugansk, which have been de facto independent since 2014. In these referendums, the citizens of these four territories were asked a simple question: do you want to be part of the Russian Federation, yes or no?

The referendums lasted five days, and in the end the results were unequivocal in all four territories – the participants in the referendums overwhelmingly voted for reintegration into the Russian Federation, which they did shortly afterwards. Territories of the former Ukraine have again become territories of Mother Russia.

So Russia has not only changed the rules of the game – it has changed the game itself. Henceforth, instead of Ukrainian forces fighting Russian forces on Ukraine’s territory, any future combat by Ukraine against Russian forces will constitute an attack on the Russian heartland itself.

Where does that leave NATO? The leadership of the alliance has made it clear from day one that it will not seek direct confrontation with Russia, while individual members have pumped tens of billions of dollars worth of materials into Ukraine and provided vital logistical and intelligence support. But Brussels has repeatedly and emphatically stated that it has no desire to wage a direct war with Russia and has made it clear that it would rather see Ukraine as a de facto NATO proxy in the resistance against Russia.

In assisting Ukraine, NATO has gone all out, both economically and politically, to the extent that some of its members, having emptied their own armies of equipment and materiel, simply have nothing left to give. Despite this, European political and business elites continue to express their strong support for Ukraine.

However, this support was based on the basic assumption that by providing this massive support to Ukraine, NATO would not directly engage in a conflict with Moscow. But Russia has changed the game plan, shifting the battlefield from a battlefield on Ukrainian soil to a battlefield on its own soil, where it is now defending its own territory.

NATO, so committed to Ukraine, is now “on the horns of a dilemma” – if it continues to provide massive material and financial support to Ukraine, it will effectively become a party to this conflict, something that no one in the world can imagine Alliance wants. However, if NATO pulls away from supporting Ukraine, the various Western political leaders and institutions who have made supporting Kyiv a sacred obligation will be seen as breaching their word.

How NATO will proceed remains to be seen, but there are signs it will not pursue supporting Ukraine at all costs. The lukewarm speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, in which he condemned Russia for the referendums while showing no enthusiasm for Ukraine’s “accelerated application” for membership of the alliance, is an indication of a less-than-firm stance in support for Kyiv.

The role of NATO is now also being weakened by the consequences of the Russian mobilization and the referendums. In a few years, when the history of the conflict is finally written, President Putin’s decision to simultaneously mobilize Russian reserves and at the same time to incorporate the territory of southern and eastern Ukraine into the Russian Federation will serve as one of the most important examples in modern history how to drive an opponent “on the horns of a dilemma”. The effective neutralization of NATO by this action will most likely be seen as a turning point in the conflict that sealed Ukraine’s fate in the face of an inevitable Russian victory.

Scott Ritter is a former US Marine Corps intelligence officer. He served in the Soviet Union as an inspector in the implementation of the INF treaty, on General Schwarzkopf’s staff during the Gulf War and as UN weapons inspector from 1991 to 1998. 

Source article: https://detv.us/2022/10/03/after-the-accession-of-the-peoples-republics-to-russia-nato-finds-itself-in-a-dilemma-rt-en/